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CWT-2671
October 24, 1962
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary
The Under Secretary ✓
SUBJECT: ^{SS: MB} Cuba in the Security Council

1. The Security Council will reconvene around 5:00 this afternoon. Meanwhile, all the leading members of the UN will be stirring around looking for a way out of an extremely dangerous situation.

2. Three mediation efforts can be currently identified:

a. The UAR (together with Algeria) is floating a draft "restrain yourselves and talk" resolution. There have been some changes since yesterday. The resolution, showing the changes is attached at TAB A.

b. The Brazilian and Mexican delegates have approached Arthur Dean and asked whether it would be useful for them to try to get the Cubans and Soviets and to agree to a package that would call for no more introduction of offensive military equipment, the stationing of UN observers in Cuba, and, in return, the lifting of the quarantine. (Their package does not seem to include a ban on further development of missile bases, with materiel already in Cuba. It certainly does not come anywhere near "dismantling and withdrawal.")

c. U Thant has not yet started to mediate, but in response to the urging of a large group of neutrals will shortly issue what he describes (to Ambassador Stevenson) as a "balanced" appeal to the President and Mr. Khrushchev.

3. We face now the problem of whether to press to a vote the US resolution, and therefore also the Cuban and Soviet resolutions. (Texts of the U.S. and Soviet resolutions are at TAB B). My present view is that it would not be wise to press for a vote forthwith. The Security Council is a better umbrella for behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Soviets than the General Assembly would be. We can control the voting on procedural and substantive matters much better if we stay in the Security Council. If we press our resolution to a vote, collect our seven votes, and draw the promised Soviet veto,

it would

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it would be hard to avoid going on into the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Shifting the venue to the General Assembly would heat up the political atmosphere, which is what we do not need.

4. If we decide that the matter should remain in the Security Council for the moment, and we do not press our resolution to a vote there today, there are several levels on which we can operate. They are not mutually exclusive, and some combination of them may prove to be the best arrangement:

a. We can agree to a bland resolution that merely asks the parties to get together or asks the Secretary General to get them together. I think we would have to assume that, for some purposes at least, the "parties concerned" now include all members of the OAS.

b. We might agree, as an interim measure, to some form of stand-still resolution but it will have to be one which clearly left our quarantine in effect until there are some arrangements for dismantling and withdrawing the missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba.

c. We might discreetly encourage an immediate broadening of the issue, to include the whole problem of nuclear missile capabilities at future bases. A way of doing this is illustrated by the resolution at TAB C, which might be put forward by the Irish and/or other appropriate neutrals.

d. We might use the crisis atmosphere to try to get a substantial leap forward in the whole field of arms control. This could take the form of a Heads of Government meeting, at Geneva, of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee, which could provide the occasion for agreement on an atmospheric test ban, an intensification of the work on avoiding surprise attack, and an exercise in summitry. A provision along this line is also included in the draft resolution at TAB C.

5. As of 2:00 p.m. today, my recommendations would be:

✓ a. To keep the matter in the Security Council for the time being;

b. To encourage

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- 10 b. To encourage a broadening of the discussion to include the Turkish and Italian base problems;
- 11 c. To insist on withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba before lifting our quarantine (i.e., not to be willing to trade our quarantine for a mere standstill arrangement); and
- 11 d. Do everything we can to use the crisis atmosphere to intensify practical discussions of arms control.


Harlan Cleveland

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